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SPEECH
OF
HON. J. J. CRITTENDEN,
OF KENTUCKY,
ON
THE ACQUISITION OF CUBA.

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 15, 1859.

The Senate having resumed the consideration of the bill making appropriation to facilitate the acquisition of the Island of Cuba by negotiation—Mr. CRITTENDEN said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I will, as plainly and briefly as I can, state the views which I entertain in relation to this important and interesting subject. The Island of Cuba has always been a subject of no little anxiety and interest to this country. Lying immediately upon the borders of our great continent, across the Gulf of Mexico, and at the mouth of the Mississippi river, it cannot be otherwise, in many points of view, than a matter of great consequence to us. It belongs, however, to another. It is the property of Spain by every title that nations recognize. It was among the first discoveries of her great navigator, Columbus. There he lived and there his remains repose. His life, his death, his history, is a monument of her title. Desirable as it has been regarded to the country, our anxiety to possess it has never blinded us to her rights. We have acknowledged, and we have declared, over and over again, that, while it remains hers, we never intend to question or disturb her in the possession. Our policy, in regard to it, has been as distinct as any policy which this Government has avowed in relation to any subject whatever. We acknowledge that it is Spain's; we acquiesce in her possession; but it is far more important and desirable to us than it is even to her; and we desire to acquire it; but this we must insist upon, that she shall transfer it to no one but ourselves, and that we cannot, with a due regard to our own rights and our own interests, suffer it to go into the hands of another Power. That has been our policy. We have avowed it fairly and frankly before the world. We have made known to Spain our wish to acquire it. We have, perhaps, on more than one occasion, offered to purchase the island. These offers have all been unavailing. With the pride which characterized that proud people, who remember their renown when they have lost almost all those imperial possessions that gave that renown to them, they are loth to part with anything that carries with it the remembrance of the ancient days of their empire and their glory. They hold this island with Spanish tenacity, and we have not yet succeeded.

The President now informs us that the time has come to renew our negotiations for the purchase. He desires to obtain it "by honorable negotiation;" and he says, "we would not, if we could, acquire Cuba in any other manner." With this declaration, the President proposes to renew the negotiation. Sir, I have no objection to that. The President will pursue on this subject that course which his own discretion and his own wisdom, and the responsibility of his great office, may dictate to him. I am content that he should. Independent

of us, independent of our legislation, the President has a right to negotiate for this or any other object with the Spanish Government. He has a right, founded upon the Constitution, not derivable from us or controlable by us, now to negotiate; and if he can obtain from her, by negotiation, a cession of the Island of Cuba, there are few here, I think, who will not be prepared to hail the acquisition with pleasure.

Sir, I desire to take my whole responsibility on this great subject, and to express my opinions thoroughly in regard to it. It is my duty to do so; and here among my brother counselors to give my counsel freely and independently, and on my responsibility, before our common countrymen. I say, let the President go on, if his judgment so dictates, in an attempt to negotiate for the acquisition of Cuba. He will distinguish his administration if he can make a suitable and satisfactory treaty for its acquisition; but for myself, I must confess I do not look upon his success as probable. I look upon the time and the season in which he is making the attempt, as the most unpropitious that has occurred, or that could easily occur, for his success. Look, for a moment, at the condition of Spain: Is she in a mood, is she in circumstances to afford us any promise that now is the time and the present Administration the Administration to which she is willing to make the sale? When the annunciation, to which I have alluded, from the President, of his intention to attempt the purchase of Cuba went forth to the world in the early part of December in the President's annual message, what was the echo that returned from all the Spanish possessions to us—I may say, almost, from all Europe—what was the response? In Cuba even, in provincial, down-trodden Cuba, the province of a despotism, Spanish pride was excited. The proposition in the message for the use of money to accomplish it, and the declaration of the purpose to all the world, seemed to them to contain something offensive. At least, according to my information, it had the effect of rallying almost every man in the Island of Cuba in opposition to our purchase. They were not to be meted out and bought and sold in the market. That idea was offensive even to them, humiliated, as they have been by long subjection, to a heavy despotism. We had not asked them whether they would be willing to be sold; we had no information that they were willing to be sold. It is assuming a good deal, to suppose that a community so long established, occupying such a delightful situation on the face of the earth, rich, enlightened, I may say prosperous, are willing not only to be sold, but to submit to it unasked and uninvited. This I presume to be the reason which produced such a concurrence there, in opposition to, and in denunciation of the President's statement. But perhaps Cuba is of little consequence in such a negotiation; she has no voice; she is but a province; the despotism of the mother country has left her no voice, has left her no counsel on the subject of her own destiny. How, then, has the same message and the annunciation of our purpose been received in Spain? The Government of the Queen of Spain have declared that they consider it an offense. Her ministers went before the Cortes, the great Congress of that country, and were there immediately questioned on the subject: "How do you intend to answer the American proposition to buy of us the Island of Cuba?" and all agreed that it was to be regarded as an offense and an indignity. This information we have since the message was delivered. We know, then, that Spain not only has not been conciliated at all by our diplomacy, by our manner of approaching her on this subject; but, on the contrary, she is prepared to consider the President's message as an insult. If the President could have known that his message would have been thus received, would he have thought it advisable to follow up this negotiation? When some few years ago Mr. Marcy, then our Secretary of State, was writing to Mr. Soulé, our Minister to Spain, in reference to this subject, he said:

"In the present aspect of the case, the President does not deem it proper to authorize you to make any proposition for the purchase of that island. There is now no hope, as he believes, that such a proposition would be favorably received; and the offer of it might, and probably would, be attended with injurious effects."

If the circumstances existing before Mr. Marcy, and presented to his mind in 1853, when he penned the instructions to Mr. Soulé, indicated to him that Spain would not sell, how much stronger are all the circumstances now from

which we may presume the same thing? The President gives us no information from which we can indulge the hope of success; he gives no information but that which is common in the politics of the world; he gives no single fact, no single particle of information; he simply says, we want Cuba; and the time has come when he thinks the negotiation should be renewed. Why does he think so? If there were any information presented to instruct our judgment; if the President had had any communication whatever with the Spanish Government that justified the belief, that she would sell or could give us any assurance from Spain, the case would be different; but she has always, heretofore, refused. There exists every circumstance now that ever did exist at any former time to suppose that she is not willing to part with the island. In addition to all that formerly existed, we have now the positive known fact that Spain regards as an insult even the declaration made in the message of our President. I presume we are to regard this as authentic. We hear no contradiction. It comes by every channel of information from Europe, and there is none to doubt it. Perhaps she has been too sensitive on this subject; perhaps there was no occasion for her anger, or for treating this subject in such an angry mood as she has done. I do not justify or vindicate that; I say nothing about it; but I state the fact that, whether for good or ill, she did become irritated at the very announcement contained in the President's message, and declared that she would consider any intimation from us of a proposition to buy Cuba, if made hereafter, as an insult. This is, in substance, the declaration of the Spanish Government; not simply of its ministry, but of its Cortes, the great national legislative and political power of the country.

With this knowledge on our part, if the President, with or without this bill, should proceed to propose to the Spanish Government, in the face of their declaration that they will consider it an insult, how could they avoid considering that as an insult—a premeditated insult; an offense committed against their avowed feeling on the subject? The President will find the negotiation a difficult task under these circumstances. There will be the more honor and the more glory to him, if, from all these difficulties, he can derive success. Let him go on, then; and I say God speed him in this negotiation; and if he can get it on satisfactory terms, and save us from the possible feuds and possible wars of which Cuba might otherwise become the cause hereafter, let him take to himself all the honor and all the credit of it. I do not believe that anything can be done. I believe, as Mr. Marcy said, in 1853, to make this proposition and have it rejected will be of injurious effect, and cast us further back from the object at which we aim. Those instructions of his are full of wise and cautious lessons to us. They show the prudence, the skill, and the address of a statesman. "Our object is to obtain the island by negotiation. Proceed cautiously. If you find it offensive, make no proposition; and so improbable does success appear to us now," says he to Mr. Soulé, "that you are not authorized to make any proposition, because evil consequences will follow from the proposition made and rejected. Our diplomacy has rather leave this subject open without any barrier of that sort against our future attempts made at more propitious times. We will seek favorable occasions in the thousand vicissitudes and events which affect the destiny and the fate of nations; we will find some opportunity when Spain will be more easily conciliated—when circumstances will favor our proposition; and we do not wish now, by any premature and precipitate effort, to create any difficulty hereafter."

These are my views; and I say again, I shall not be disappointed if the President is deceived in his expectations. I do not believe that he can, at this time, purchase Cuba. I think, therefore, it would be impolitic to give offense by making a proposition which we foreknow will be rejected. If we do foreknow; if, in our judgment, we can reasonably anticipate it, and as surely anticipate it as we can the future in any respect, would it not be an utter want of prudence, an utter want of wisdom, to give voluntary offense to Spain by thrusting an insulting proposition, or what she considers an insulting proposition, upon her, and doing that in the face of the world? For it seems to be thought best to depart from the quiet ways of diplomacy, and to make this subject of negotiation one of public debate and public legislation. It gives a character of

more publicity, it gives a character of more point, to the conduct which Spain has taken on this subject, and to that which we are to take. In the face of the world, the Cortes and the ministry of a proud, ancient nation, have said it will be an insult to ask them to sell this portion of their empire, and they will resent it as an insult. Even if they said this not altogether in earnest, or if they said this boastfully, can they, in the face of all Europe, and within a few months, before the shoes they wore have grown old, come down and trample on these declarations? No, sir; no man, no nation, can face that amount of shame, self-contradiction, and self-degradation, before the world. We cannot succeed now by honorable negotiation, because Spain is utterly opposed, according to all the calculations of human conduct that can be made, to sell this island.

I think we have reason furthermore to consider this scheme is impracticable, at present, from the foreign connections and alliances of Spain. We have seen, and we know, the anxiety with which the Governments of both England and France have regarded Cuba; how readily they have been disposed to go to its relief and protection and defence; how they have proposed to this Government to enter into a tripartite treaty with them, renouncing forever all pretensions to the Island of Cuba, and guarantying it forever to Spain. They have shown a degree of solicitude that leaves us but little ground to hope that now, with their present views of policy, they would encourage, or I might almost say permit, Spain to sell to us this island. Spain is in the hands of mighty auxiliaries, altogether beyond her power; and the actions of her Government are, to a great extent, we may suppose, influenced by French and by English counsels. Indeed, it was intimated by the honorable gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. BENJAMIN) in the remarks which he so eloquently and instructively made a few days since, that it might be even now that Spain held the island rather as a trustee for the use of England than in her own right. If so, how can we expect Spain to transfer it without the assent of England? If France also has an interest in it, and a control over the counsels of Spain, we must anticipate her concurrence also before we can indulge a reasonable hope of the acquisition of it at this time. Let the President, however, go on. He may understand all these difficulties far better than I do; or, understanding them as I do, he may hope for some powerful influence and agency by which he is to overcome all these difficulties, and get the island. Be it so. I say to him, "go on; and if you can acquire Cuba, do it, and I will not be hindmost in rendering you praise and credit and honor for it; you will have done something for your country."

I think then, sir, that there never was a time, so far as regards Spain, more unpropitious to our hopes of a successful negotiation. Now, let us look a little at the question as it regards ourselves, and see whether, in that respect, the time is peculiarly favorable to our acquisition of this island.

I have observed from all sides that it is anticipated that we are to give a great price in money. The learned and able report made by the honorable Senator from Louisiana, (Mr. SLIDELL,) as the organ of the Committee on Foreign Relations, informs us that about ten years ago, or more, \$100,000,000 was offered, and Spain declined it. It is supposed, in the same report, that there has been an increase of value since that time, which might make the real value now one hundred and twenty, or one hundred and thirty, or one hundred and forty million dollars. One hundred and forty million dollars is our bid here among ourselves. What will we give Spain for it when we go to bidding and get fairly engaged in making the bargain, with nothing to settle but the price? In common conversation I have heard \$200,000,000 familiarly stated as the price to be given, and it is considered a good bargain at that. It may be more; not very probably less. Say \$200,000,000 is to be the price she will exact and we will give: when are we to pay it? Are we now in the most favorable financial condition for paying it, or providing for it? On account of our own little domestic difficulties, we have been obliged to go in debt to supply our own household; to supply market money. We have had to borrow, within a year past, \$40,000,000, and are now under imminent necessity for obtaining more. So far as concerns our Treasury, then, it renders a mournful sound when

you knock upon it and ask for \$200,000,000. A funeral response comes forth; there is nothing there; it is all emptiness.

Look at your revenue. Does that come in in any such way as to render you at all hopeful that, besides paying the expenses of the Government, it will fill up that vacancy? No, sir; not at all. Your Treasury is not only vacant, but your revenue is deficient, and your expenditures are increasing and likely to increase. Last year the expenditures were more than eighty-one million dollars; this year they will be \$100,000,000, if we pay our debts honestly. That is my estimate; that is what I learn from those who trouble themselves much more about figures and financial calculations than I do. I see that the Secretary of the Treasury estimates for \$74,000,000. I see that in that estimate the probable deficiencies in the Post Office Department—that vault which swallows up, and seems still to swallow and swallow and never be filled—are not included. They may be estimated at \$6,000,000. That, addition to the \$74,000,000, makes \$80,000,000. Then suppose you pay the \$20,000,000 of Treasury notes which have been issued, and are payable on or before the 30th of June next, and you have \$100,000,000 to pay this year, without including any appropriations which Congress may make in excess of the estimates. If the payment of these \$20,000,000 of Treasury notes be now postponed, they must fall on another year. I do not, at present, see when we can calculate upon having in the Treasury a surplus in order to make this purchase.

I do not mean to say that in a proper cause, upon a proper occasion, we could not produce whatever any exigency our country might require, in money or in men. We could do it; but it is a little more convenient to do it at one time than at another; and I am only inquiring to see whether this is the auspicious and convenient time when we can most readily and conveniently make preparation for the payment of \$200,000,000, or whether we are to have it fastened upon us, and fastened upon our posterity for an interminable period of time, and to pay a stipend to Spain or her assignees of \$10,000,000 a year as the interest of this purchase money. I do not say it will become an everlasting obligation, for nothing is so with us; but it will come to be a fastened debt upon us of which no man can see the end. That is one point of view.

What is our condition in other respects? Are there no other difficulties? I admit that, if the only difficulties in our way were the want of money, and our mere transient necessities about revenue, we could overcome them all. I do not underrate our financial ability, or our spirit, or our enterprise. I know my country, and I know that her energies are almost unlimited. I do not look, however, with any comfort, at a debt which is to stand at \$200,000,000. Debt has an attractive power. One debt of \$200,000,000 will be a standing temptation to more. It will become a national, interminable debt. But this is not all; we have got troubles and difficulties all around. It was once the great policy of this Government to preserve amity and the kindest relations with all the States of North and South America; and we succeeded. A noble course of policy it was. I was here when they were springing into independence—emerging from that Spanish despotism into which they had been immersed for so many ages. I remember the sensibility and the sympathy with which we all regarded the struggles going on in South America; and, as a Kentuckian, I remember with especial pride that it was the trumpet-toned voice of Henry Clay that led on this great subject of American policy and American sympathy. In South America, at that early day, nothing was so much cherished; and the speeches of Henry Clay in their behalf, proffering peace and friendship and kindness to them, and encouragement in their efforts, were read at the head of their armies, and hailed with shouts and enthusiasm. They came into the world as free nations, as it were, under our auspices; hailed, cheered on, and encouraged, by the voice of America. All their eyes were turned on us; we were an exemplar to them. What has become of that feeling? Where is it, you rulers of our people, where is it? or how is it that you have lost all these good feelings on their part? The good will of a whole continent is a mighty fund of national strength; and we have lost it. The nations of South America were striving to establish such liberty as we had established; striving to connect themselves with us by all those bonds which unite Republics, to take our

stand against the great European world, and the great European system. That was the object of this policy.

At the close of the great wars of Europe, when Spain solicited assistance to resubjugate her South American colonies, when their menacing reached the ears of the rulers of this country, what was done? It was the mightiest question that had been presented to the world in this century—whether South America should be Europeanized and fall under the European system of government and policy, or whether it should be Americanized according to the American system of republics. What a mighty question was it! By kindness, by encouragement, by offers of kindness and sympathy, we won their hearts, and they fell into our system. They gave us all their sympathy; but now, where has it gone? Read the last message of the President, and consider the troubled state of our relations with these States which it depicts. There is not a State where we do not find enemies, where our citizens are free from violence, where their property is not taken from them. It seems that the persons and property of our citizens are exposed continually to daily violence in every State of South America with which we have relations. It is so, too, in Mexico and Guatemala and Costa Rica, and the various States of Central America.

How has it been that this state of things has been brought about? How has it been that we have lost that mighty acquisition—an acquisition, not of territory, but an acquisition of the hearts of men; an acquisition of the hearts of nations, ready to follow our lead; to stand by us in a common cause, to fight the world, if it were necessary? That great golden chain that bound freemen together from one end of the North to the end of the South American continent, has been broken in a thousand pieces; and the message tells us the sad tale that we are everywhere treated with enmity and hostility, and that it is necessary for us to avenge it. We are gathering up little accounts with these nations; we are making quarrels with them. They have done some wrong; practiced some enmity against our citizens; taken some property that they ought not to have taken; and, besides, we have claims against them. From the Feejee Islands to the Spanish throne, we have demands to be urged; and I think we are coming to a very summary process of collection, where no Congress is to sit to examine into the *casus belli*, but a ship of war, better than all the constables in the world, is to go around collecting, from the cannibals and others, whatever she is commissioned to say is due to us.

What peace can we have, what good will can we have among men, if we are to depart from the noble course which governed our forefathers, who had no quarrels but those which they could make a fight out of, and ought to have made a fight out of, directly and at once, and be done with them? Do all these little clouds or specks of war that darken our horizon promise additional prosperity, or an increase of revenue to meet our debts? No, sir. If they portray anything, they portray the contrary—increased expenditures; for however summary your collections, however summarily you take vengeance on other nations, it costs always, and it will cost, a good deal. Fighting is an expensive luxury; luxury it may be considered, but there is cost in it.

Now, sir, what are we about to do? In view all the enmities that surround us in South America and in Central America, the Committee on Foreign Relations have presented a little bill to meet the emergencies of the case, and the causes of war are so common that it would trouble Congress too much to act and decide on them all; they must be struck off the docket in a summary way, and judgment must be executed immediately under the orders and mandate of the President. Here is the title of the bill: "A bill authorizing the President of the United States to use the public forces of the United States in the cases therein specified." Allow me to read the cases that are specified:

"Whereas the President of the United States, in discharge of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution, 'from time to time to give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,' has informed Congress that, by reason of the distracted and revolutionary condition of Mexico, of certain of the States of Central America, and occasionally of those in South America, as well the property as the lives and liberties of American citizens, peaceably and rightfully within their respective limits, are subjected to lawless violence or otherwise placed in peril by those claiming to be in authority, and for redress whereof negotiation and remonstrance in the forms of diplomatic intercourse are attempted in vain; and it being manifest to

Congress that such condition of things in the States aforesaid will continue so long as government is found there in the unsettled and irresponsible condition, at present, and at times heretofore, tolerated by their people; and it being the indispensable duty of the Government of the United States, to protect its citizens against lawless violence without the limits of the United States whenever found on lawful errand: Therefore,

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever it shall be made to appear to the President that any citizen or citizens of the United States have been subjected, within the limits of any of the States aforesaid, and without commensurate offence on their part, to any act of force, on the part of those claiming to be in authority therein, affecting the life or liberty of such citizen or citizens, and the case, in the opinion of the President, demands on his part the interposition hereafter provided, it shall be lawful for the President to use the land and naval forces of the United States, or such part of them as he may deem requisite, in such way as in his judgment may be most effectual by force within the country so offending, to give full and adequate relief and protection to any citizen or citizens of the United States so injured or imperiled, and at his discretion to obtain redress for any wrongs so done: Provided, That the President shall report to Congress, (if in session forthwith, or, if in recess, at its first meeting thereafter,) whatever may be done by him at any time in execution of this act: And provided, further, That as soon as the object shall be attained in any case where the provisions of this act shall be carried into execution, the land and naval forces so used shall be withdrawn."

Here, sir, we propose to let the President make war at his discretion. The Constitution says the Congress of the United States shall have the power to make war. Has anybody else the power to make war but we and the House of Representatives? Is it a little inferior jurisdiction that we can transfer and delegate to others? Did the Constitution intend that the President should exercise it? No; it gave it to us, and in the balance of power just as much denied it to the President as it gave it to us. We subvert the whole system of our Government; the whole constitutional frame-work of it is a wreck, if you take this most dangerous and most important of all powers, and put it in the hands of the President of the United States. Can you abdicate this power which the people have given you as their trustees? You cannot do it. Does not this bill do it?

To be sure, it will be observed that the right of summary redress is limited to *weak* States. There seems to be some saving understanding upon the part of the framers of this policy that it would not be applicable to large States. Some trouble, some resistance, might be anticipated from them; but you can safely thunder it over the heads of these poor little South American States; you can make them tremble; you can settle the accounts, and make them pay your own balances. Sir, what sort of heroism is that for your country and my country, to triumph over the small and the weak? The bill on which I am commenting does not suppose that war is to require formal debate, but proposes, whenever it shall be made to appear to the President that an American citizen, in any of these countries, has been the subject of violence or depredation in his property, to allow the President, at his *ipse dixit*, to make war. Unheard, unquestioned, at once the will of a single man is to let loose the dogs of war against these small, weak nations. It is a violation of the spirit of the Constitution; and, besides, there is a pettiness about it that does not belong to our country. Surely it was in a thoughtless moment that the President intimated the necessity of such a measure, or that it was introduced into the Senate. There is nothing in it that can stand investigation. It is not more uncongenial to the Constitution of the United States, than it is, I trust, to the magnanimous character of my countrymen, that they should be willing to hunt out the little and the weak and chastise them, and let the great go free or leave them to the ordinary solemn course of proceeding, by treaty or by congressional legislation. No, sir; far better is the maxim of the old Roman—*debellare superbos*.

If the bill on which I am commenting should pass, can we expect to be at peace? According to the message, every one of these Powers has been guilty of outrages which are said to merit war, to deserve that sort of redress. They are the daily habit; they are of almost continual occurrence. Suppose the past is not to be the subject of these little Presidential wars; are we safe in the future?

That is not all; we are now engaged in the task of chastising one of the little South American States. We passed at the last session a resolution whose whole pith and substance is expressed, I believe, in about two lines, the full intent and scope of which I verily confess I did not comprehend at the time it was passed, authorizing the President to exercise his discretion in taking pro-

per means, by force or otherwise, to obtain redress from Paraguay. We have to renew our geographical knowledge to point out the places against which we are now to direct our forces. The policy of the Administration seems to be to search over all the *weak* nations of the American continents for little causes of offense and quarrel. Our countrymen generally are the readiest men to strike back that ever I knew, and yet it seems a Yankee can no sooner go traveling abroad than somebody imposes on him, and cheats him, or strikes him, and he must come to his Government and make a claim. If he was struck, do you not think he struck back, and settled the account right off, at once? I believe it is the Yankee, Mr. Hopkins, who says Lopez cheated him out of some of his property in Paraguay. Be that as it may, we have now sent out a fleet consisting of, I do not know how many vessels, great and small, good and bad, some bought, and some built; the greatest armada we ever sent abroad, and to do what? To find Lopez, the Paraguayan chief, who I have no idea is at all comparable in ability, if he even is in power, to John Ross, the Cherokee chief-tain. But to this poor, little, obscure Power we are quite revengeful for an injury. It is said that in their inhumanity or hostility, they fired a gun at one of our ships, and robbed some property from a Mr. Hopkins, who, if I understand rightly, never had any property. That is really about the history of that transaction, as I understand it. We have sent an armada to cross the ocean, to ascend mighty rivers, with an army of three thousand men on board the fleet, for the purpose of taking satisfaction from Mr. Lopez, for the Paraguayan wrong to Mr. Hopkins and to Captain Page.

All this may have been well and proper. I am no more for submitting to insults than are others; but I think I might receive other insults that I would prefer first to notice. I think our imperial eagle, which is spoken of so eloquently, soaring over our heads, and making her way to the skies, need not have sent three thousand miles to punish a petty, dirty chief of Paraguay, whose whole people, men and women, hardly exceed the limits of one of our Indian tribes. Was it worth our while? We have sent a fleet, a spectacle to all the nations on every side, to make our name terrible among the regions of South America. Sir, formerly, it was our great and glorious policy to make our name respected and loved. Now we sail ten thousand miles to avenge an insult, and make it notorious to all the world. The cannon is to tell all the world, that the American Republic is in a great passion at Paraguay. That is the way we are getting on, and under the bill of which I have spoken, we shall have a dozen such little wars to amuse us, morning, noon, and evening.

Sir, that is no way to make that progress which I trust my country is to make. I am for progress; yes, I am for all that progress which is consistent with conservatism, and I am for all that conservatism which is consistent with progress. That is my view. I am for proceeding wisely and slowly. Let "hasten slowly" be our maxim of policy. I think it is not an unwise one, though I have no doubt it has something a little old fogyism about it.

In addition to all this, what more mischief have we to do in the world now? What violation of the peace of others have we to commit, in order to keep our own? The President of the United States, in his message, suggests that we shall seize two provinces of Mexico, Chihuahua and Sonora; and there is no doubt, we are told, that Mexico will consider it a very friendly act. It would be a little surprising to me if she did, for it has not been ordinarily the case that a nation considered such action friendly. But we are to seize these two provinces; for what purpose? To defend our frontier of Arizona against Indians and Mexicans, who come from the Mexican side! That is the reason urged for it.

Now, Mr. President, does it occur to you that it is absolutely necessary to go on the Mexican side to prevent them from invading Arizona? Suppose you were to place troops within our own borders on this side of the Mexican line, would not that prevent invasions of Arizona just as well? But we want a little exercise to employ the Army; we want them in constant athletic exercise, prepared for war, ready to defend the frontiers of Arizona, which is said to be as utter a wilderness as the sun shines upon within the limits of this continent. In all its vast borders, there are not more than ten thousand people at the high-

est estimate, and eight thousand of them, I believe, are included now within the territorial government of New Mexico.

Mr. COLLAMER. All of them; Arizona is all in New Mexico.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. There are a few sparse settlements hundreds and hundreds of miles apart, constituting what we call, poetically, Arizona. It is to defend Arizona that you are to take possession of two somewhat populous States, old States, in Mexico—Chihuahua and Sonora. Nothing could be more rash; nothing could be a more heedless violation of the rights of other neutral nations than that we should undertake to seize upon a portion of the territory of Mexico.

We are to set out upon all these works. The President is to have power to make little wars with little nations all around, and he is to seize Chihuahua and Sonora to defend our wilderness of Arizona from Mexican or Indian invasions. There are very few people there, if any; and as for the old common law complaint for entering a man's close and treading down his grass, if I understand it, there is very little grass there, and a man might travel for days and never trample down a single spear. All this sounds to my ears as most unwise and most improvident. We ought not to be guilty of anything that is little. If the great ambition of the nation prompts it to some violation of law or right, let it be for something worthy; something that will tend to accomplish empire, or something else worth incurring a hazard for, and worth incurring, at the time, the censure and rebuke of the world; no stealing along the border; no making of little unconstitutional, predatory, warfares; no seizing of other people's provinces, under pretence of defending our own. We can defend every inch of ours in other ways.

I must recur for a single instant to a branch of the subject that I have left behind, and I must say that I think our present President, with all his ability, and all his wisdom, and the general conciliation of his manner, is not exactly the best qualified for this negotiation; and I will tell you why. I am afraid Spain will be particularly jealous of him. We remember, in the political history of this country, that a few years ago a letter was published, under the signature of three of our foreign ministers, to the most distinguished Courts of Europe, of whom Mr. Buchanan was one. I allude to the Ostend letter, which was signed by Mr. Buchanan, our Minister to England, Mr. Mason, our Minister to France, and Mr. Soulé, our Minister to Spain. Spain was supposed to take considerable offence at that letter. It taught this doctrine: that if Cuba, in our judgment, was more important and valuable to us than it was to Spain, and we offered Spain what *we* thought was a fair price, and she refused to take it, then there was a sort of intimation, that seemed to be so evanescent and so sublime, that it was hid a little in the clouds; but the result of it all, to mortal ears and mortal appreciation, was, *then take it*. Who knows but that Spain may consider this offer, thus publicly made against her avowed will, as that sort of diplomatic conclusion that we mean to buy if she will sell, but, if she will not, to take the island?

In my poor judgment, Mr. President, the time never was so unpropitious as it is now to make this purchase. We are proposing to buy what the owner will not sell, and what we have not the money to pay for. We must go on credit for it. I say again to the President, "Go on, sir; the object is worthy of your efforts; buy Cuba if you can. If, against all these circumstances, which would seem to repel every hope of success, you do succeed, the more is your honor and the greater is your credit." The President has the power to negotiate independent of us; the Constitution gives him power to appoint ministers and conduct negotiations; let him exercise his judgment upon the subject; he stands responsible to the country. When he shall have made a treaty, he must lay it before us, and then we shall act upon our responsibility. I say to him, "Go on, with a full assurance that if you can obtain the cession on fair terms, we will ratify your treaty, and comply with all the conditions of payment." This is the general course of all our negotiations. The President makes a treaty and we ratify it; and thus the nation has the benefit and the assurance of the independent action of each of these two responsible parties; its

guarantees and securities are double. I do not, in extraordinary cases, however, take any exception to the President's previous consultation with the Senate; but I say the general rule is, for the President to take the whole of his own responsibility; to appoint his minister and negotiate his treaty; and when he has done that, he refers it to the Senate, and they advise and consent to its ratification or rejection; and this, I say, is the most advantageous course, generally, for the nation. All other modes are exceptional. This is the general, safe, and constitutional rule; each to act separately and independently, so as to give to the whole country the greatest possible assurance that these independent powers, by their concurrent action, will guard the interests of the country.

I have cheered the President on, telling him candidly the difficulties I found in the way, and expressing my want of faith in his success at the present time; but I say to him, "Go on, sir; and the more be your honor, if I have halted in this great career; go on, and the more honor you will be entitled to for yourself, if you succeed." But the President tells us further, in his message:

"The publicity which has been given to our former negotiations upon this subject, and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose, render it expedient, before making another attempt to renew the negotiation, that I should lay the whole subject before Congress. This is especially necessary, as it may become indispensable to success that I should be intrusted with the means of making an advance to the Spanish Government immediately after the signing of the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate. I am encouraged to make this suggestion, by the example of Mr. Jefferson previous to the purchase of Louisiana from France, and by that of Mr. Polk in view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico."

Thirty million dollars is the sum which has been settled upon as that which is indispensable to the President's success; and, in the language of the bill, this is to enable him to make a treaty with Spain, and the money is to be used after the treaty shall have been ratified by Spain and signed by the representative of this Government, without awaiting its ratification by the Senate. This is the money that is wanted for that purpose. There is my difficulty. The President is encouraged by the instance, in the administration of Mr. Jefferson, of an appropriation for the purpose of making his purchase of Louisiana. It ought to have encouraged him but very little. If he had reflected upon these cases and the difference between them, I think he would not press the analogy. What were the circumstances, what was the powerful exigency, that existed in the case of the acquisition of Louisiana? Mr. Jefferson, with all the adroitness of a skillful and veteran ruler, had been negotiating, and had ministers running between Madrid and Paris for the purpose of getting up and consummating the purchase of Louisiana. Spain was under obligation, in exchange for territory given by France—the Duchy of Parma, I think—and for some other considerations, to concede Louisiana to Napoleon. This was the condition of things. War was then flagrant, or it had broken out, or was just about to break out, after the peace of Amiens, between England and France, and of course it would spread over the whole continent. Bonaparte apprehended that, if it became known to England that he was the beneficial owner of Louisiana, England would proceed against Louisiana as his property as soon as a British fleet could sail across the ocean. With Spain she was at peace. This rendered Bonaparte willing to sell—anxious to sell. The United States apprehended that England would seize it, and all parties were adverse to that. Bonaparte found this Government willing and anxious to make the purchase. He wanted money instantly, as he was about to be engaged in a war with all the world.

These were the exigent circumstances under which Mr. Jefferson was able to inform Congress, "We can buy Louisiana, but it must be done now; prompt action is necessary; postpone it to go through the ordinary forms of diplomacy and negotiation, and the prize is lost forever, for England will seize it." That was the reason, and that makes the case different from this. The general rule is to pay only after the treaty is made and both parties have ratified it; but here there was a necessity to do a little more than that, because of the exigency which the case required. Is that the general mode in which the President of the United States and the Senate exercise the treaty-making power?

Certainly it is not. We all know, by daily practice and experience what the ordinary rule is. This is an exception. This is not the safe, ordinary, beaten path of the Constitution. It is a new and exceptional way to embrace an exceptional case.

The other case which encourages the President is that of Mr. Polk in respect to Mexico. We had had a war with Mexico, and Mr. Polk was very anxious to make a treaty by which we should obtain some territory. It was very doubtful whether there was vitality or national function enough left in Mexico even to make a treaty. This Government had, as it were, to hold her up to get her to sign the terms of the treaty. She had no government; she had no army; all were swept away. She had not a single limb of government left. We had really to bring her into existence by money, for the purpose of getting her to sign the treaty. We were very anxious to make peace, because, if we did not make peace with her, we feared she would soon expire, and give up her national existence.

I know that was some of the trouble of Mr. Polk. It was apprehended that we could not find anybody in Mexico to make peace with. We knew what was the condition of the country—utterly exhausted. We voted \$2,000,000 in the exigencies of that case, to enable Mexico to make a treaty; and what sort of a treaty? We knew the treaty would be dictated just as the President directed our negotiator to make it. That was the consequence, and the plain, flat case before us. There was no power of resistance, no power of contradiction. We wrote a treaty, and she signed it; and we knew that would be the case.

Now, how different is this case? Can the President of the United States and the Secretary of State give us any assurance that Spain wants to sell this island? or, if she does want to sell it, any reason for this exigency, hastening the matter with such rapidity as to depart from the usual course, and make \$30,000,000 as a previous payment, taking it out of all the safeguards which surround it in the Treasury of the United States, and place it in the hands of the President? Sir, I have, I may say, a high degree of confidence in the personal integrity of the President; but that is not the question with me here. I am dealing with considerations far beyond those which are merely personal. If, without a single reason to make this an exception, like the case of Louisiana or the case of Mexico, without a single reason to take it out of the ordinary course of negotiation, we agree to consider it so, is it not a precedent for having at all times hereafter a permanent appropriation, say of thirty or fifty millions, to aid the President in any negotiation he may find it convenient to make throughout the world? Why not do that? If it is right in a case which has not a single exceptional circumstance connected with it, it is right in every case. Why not make a permanent appropriation, and say that the President may take the money out of the Treasury of the United States; may take it to the White House for greater security, if he thinks proper; may keep it there in his pocket until the time comes when, according to the provisions of the bill, he may use it? This exigency supposes that Spain will be influenced by having the money paid down instantly, or contemporaneously with her ratification of the treaty. Then, where must the money be? In Spain. The President must, some time before, have drawn the money out of the Treasury, have it in his own individual hands, and it must be transferred to Spain in the same unsafe condition, or at any rate freed from all the guards which protect the people's money in the Treasury of the United States. Are we prepared to do that?

I do not differ with my friends from Louisiana in their estimation of the importance of Cuba. I grant that Cuba is desirable. It is a rich and valuable possession. It would be more important to the United States, I, as an American, verily believe, than to old Spain, or any other nation. No argument is necessary to prove to me that it is a great convenience, and a very desirable possession; and, for that reason, I say, negotiate for it in the ordinary way; make a treaty for a fair price, and upon fair terms; and, for one, I will vote the price. But why do you ask that this extraordinary course should be pursued? It is an extraordinary course. There are only two or three instances of it, and the fact of there being no more proves that it is extraordinary. They were distinguished, and made exceptions by extraordinary circumstances. This has not a single ex-

extraordinary circumstance to distinguish it. So far from it, there cannot be, in the mind of any gentleman, more than a slight probability that you can make a bargain to purchase Cuba at all; and yet, in the mean time, before a treaty is made, before the proposition is even made to the Spanish Government, from the time instructions have been given to make the proposition, the President, under the bill, may draw the money out of the Treasury, or borrow it in the street, and take the safe keeping of it into his own hands.

Now, sir, it is not for me to place, even in the hands of the President, such a temptation. The Constitution does not contemplate it. The Constitution does not put a dollar in his hands. Do you not believe that the possession of \$30,000,000 might be liable to abuse or corruption? We are not here to flatter the President by such complimentary evidences of our personal confidence. We are here upon constitutional grounds. The Constitution does not trust him with a dollar; and yet it gives him the power to negotiate treaties. He has to come to Congress for every dollar. You intrusted \$2,000,000 to a President before, under extraordinary circumstances. You are now called upon to trust \$30,000,000 without a single extraordinary circumstance. Sir, I cannot agree to it. I will not say it is out of any want of confidence in the personal integrity of the President. It is, I trust, out of my respect and reverence for the Constitution of the country. By assenting to it, I should not only be hazarding the people's money, but I should be doing more. By making one branch of the Government a depository of that money to an enormous amount, I should be augmenting the influence and the power of that particular branch of the Government, and destroying the balance of power which the Constitution intended to establish between the various departments of the Government. And I am now to do it, to enable the President to do—what? To make a treaty with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and with the positive understanding that, after the treaty has been made, if we do not choose to ratify it, we lose our \$30,000,000.

Sir, can you conceive for yourself a treaty containing a cession of the Island of Cuba, that would not require many quite important stipulations in respect to its people and future government? Is it expected that Spain is to cede it to us absolutely and without condition? Hardly. What are to be the conditions? Are we to admit her as a State into the Union at once, to have Senators on this floor, and to legislate for me who is to-day called upon to legislate for purchasing her, and to legislate for my children and my country? Is that to be it? If such a treaty were made, and \$30,000,000 were paid under it, and that treaty, when it came here, showed me under an obligation to take Cuba immediately into this Union on a footing of equality with old Kentucky, I would reject it instantly; I would care nothing for the \$30,000,000 that might have been paid upon it. What, sir, violate Government at home, or any great principle, or any great policy of it, to take in a new State of alien people, not speaking our language, not harmonizing with us in political opinion, of different political experience altogether? No, sir.

I do not suppose, Mr. President, that Cuba would be in danger of any injustice, if she were ceded to us absolutely, and without condition or stipulation in her behalf. But that is not the course of such cessions. Treaties of that kind make careful provisions for the rights, private and political, of the people of the ceded territory; and when we consider the dissimilarity that exists between the people of the United States and the people of Cuba, in language and government, habits and manners, interests and institutions, we must be made sensible how difficult it will be to settle satisfactorily with Spain, the terms of uniting of the two, and of converting Cuba into a dependency of the United States. It would be a most fortunate treaty that should accomplish that. There are many chances that it would not, and if those terms did not prove satisfactory to the Senate, the whole treaty would be rejected, and the thirty millions of money which the President now asks to be trusted with, for payment to Spain, would be lost to the people of the United States.

I do not choose needlessly to incur that hazard.

Mr. President, if Cuba was ours to-day, it would, with me, be a grave question, whether it would not be our best policy to give her a qualified Independence, to leave her to the trouble and expense of governing herself, and to say

to her: "We have redeemed you from Colonial bondage to Spain—rescued you from your European connection and dependency, and restored you to your natural relation and affiliation to the American Continent and its people. Now, set up a free government of your own, under the protection of the United States, and upon such fundamental and irrevocable terms as will ally us together in peace and war, and as will establish and secure our commercial intercourse."

Views not dissimilar to these were entertained by Mr. Marcy, as appears from his official correspondence, in 1853, with Mr. Soulé then our Minister to Spain.

I am strongly inclined to believe that such would be our best course of policy in disposing of Cuba, if it was ours. We should thereby avoid all the disturbing effects that would too probably result from its admission into the Union as a State—all the troubles, costs, and charges of its government as a territory, and the heavy expense of an army and navy for its defence.

These and other considerations of a like character induce me to believe that it would be our best interest to make Cuba, if it was at our disposal, an independent State, under our protection, and bound to us by certain liberal ties of commercial intercourse and of alliance, which are to be irrevocable. By it we free ourselves from their government, and we leave to them all the trouble and all the expenses of their own government; we relieve ourselves from all inconveniences and dangers to which the possession of Cuba by a European Power would expose us. We get all we want—peace and security for our commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. Then the island will be held, if not by us, for us by friends; we shall have bought it, and paid for it, and made them its voluntary rulers. In agreeing to grant this liberty, of course we should make such stipulations as our own security required, and which would not be incompatible with theirs.

Mr. President, I have occupied much more time than I intended on this subject. I say again, I am content that the President of the United States shall go on with negotiation and acquire, if he can, the Island of Cuba. I am not willing to give this sum of \$30,000,000. For his sake, I am not. For the country's sake, and upon the principles of the Constitution, I am not. It is not good for him to have it. As certainly as the sum exists, there will be those who will charge him with misapplying the money. What does he want with it? they will say. There is no probability of negotiating a cession with Spain, and why does the President want to keep \$30,000,000 at his sole and arbitrary control in the White House? Why does he want it? Is it to be used for any purpose of corruption, in order to get a treaty? or is the whole scheme a great general magnificent delusion; the political fireworks of the Administration set blazing now to give a new view and new complexion to its rather darkened prospects? If Spain will sell, we will pay, as soon as the bargain is ratified by both parties. That is soon enough, and Spain will be satisfied with it. Before that time, I see no plausible reason, nor has a plausible pretext been assigned by anybody who has advocated this bill, for taking the money out of the Treasury beforehand, and placing it in the pocket of the President of the United States. Suppose the proposition was that we should take the money out of the Treasury, and place it in the custody of the members of the Senate, what would the country think of it, and of the safety of their money? Sir, the Treasury of the United States is the constitutional depository of the public money, made so by the Constitution and by the law. It is not fit that we should change that depository without a reason; and if we do change it, it is not fit that we should place it in the hands of the President of the United States—the last hands in which it should be placed, the very last. His hands, at least, ought to be preserved pure; unsoiled by money; unsuspected. I would not expose him to that unescapable suspicion. I would not, without a cause, hazard the people's money in any President's hands. Our Government is not built up on the insecure foundation of personal confidence. We rely upon institutions as security for the public money and for the public rights. The Constitution did not intend to trust the purse to the same hand that held the sword.

Shall we, the Senate of the United States, disparage ourselves in the exercise of the treaty-making power? The Constitution gives us the power of passing upon the ratification of every treaty. The President, with the advantage of

money in his hands, may make a bargain that he knows is not exactly agreeable to us. Is it right to let him come to us and say, "\$30,000,000 have been paid, and if you do not ratify the treaty it will be lost?" Have we a right to place ourselves under that species of influence without a cause, unnecessarily? Where is the gentleman now who is willing to say, I will put my hand in the Treasury of the United States, take out \$30,000,000, and place it in the hands of the President to await his future arbitrary expenditure? Where is the man?

Mr. SLIDELL. Will the Senator from Kentucky allow me to make a single remark?

Mr. CRITTENDEN. Certainly.

Mr. SLIDELL. If the Senator can frame any amendment that will place this money beyond the control of the President until the treaty shall have been ratified in the manner that the President proposes in his message, and that the bill proposes, I will accept it, with a great deal of pleasure.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. I take the bill exactly as its friends, and the friends of the President, make it. I take the bill exactly as the President in his message, in terms, recommends it. I am arguing against their proposition. The President desires not only to have the \$30,000,000 given to him, but he desires further the privilege of using it before the ratification of the treaty by the Senate.

Mr. SLIDELL. Certainly.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. These are the express terms of his message. I wish to deal in all possible candor with this subject. I am not willing to make any appropriation of money, because I do not believe there is the remotest probability now of making such a treaty with Spain. I do not want to make such an appropriation for another reason, because even if I did think there was a probability that a purchase might be made, I say, let the President go on, make your treaty acquiring the island, and as soon as you have done so, and the treaty is fully ratified, I will vote the money to pay the price that is agreed to be given for it. This, I say, is the ordinary mode, and I am not willing to weaken our own hands by putting money in the hands of the President in this way. I am not willing to expose the Chief Magistrate of the country to the suspicion that would attend the arbitrary possession by him of such a sum of money. I will not vote for any previous appropriation of it in any way, because I do not believe it will be required. Because, I believe this scheme of policy will all burst like a bubble—it is a mere piece of fanfaronade, nothing more—as I said before, a sort of political fireworks set off just now to amuse and entertain the people with undefined and exaggerated projects. I will not vote for it; but say to the President, go on; and if you make a treaty, I will vote the money; but, in the meantime, excuse me for not giving \$30,000,000 out of the Treasury to put in your pocket to be kept under your safe keeping to be applied to the treaty, until I know what it is.

Mr. DAVIS. If it will not interrupt my friend from Kentucky, I wish to call his attention to a single point, that this money will be no more in the hands of the President than the appropriation for foreign intercourse now is. That is to say, it will be in the Treasury, subject to be drawn by the warrant of the President, instead of being drawn by the warrant of one of his executive officers. That will be the only difference between this money and any other. He will have no more the custody of it, save as he draws it out by a warrant, and that warrant to be entered in a book subject to future examination and inspection, than he would have of any other money in the Treasury of the United States.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. I think I comprehend this subject. The appropriation for Foreign intercourse is a peculiar fund, generally small in amount, and, from the necessity of the case, to be drawn and used at the President's discretion. But not so with other ordinary appropriations. Under them he can not draw a dollar on his own warrant.

Mr. DAVIS. Certainly; that is what I say.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. But if you pass this bill—what then? Cannot the President draw out this money the next day, or cannot he borrow it the next day, and make the Secretary of the Treasury issue certificates or stock for it, and put them in his pocket, and keep there until he deems it necessary to use them? May he not say, "I must keep it, and not only keep it, but employ my own agents to send it to Madrid?" Certainly my friend will see that this is the inevitable consequence.

Mr. DAVIS. I do not think I made myself understood. I said the difference was, he could draw it by a warrant, and only by a warrant, and that that warrant must be entered in a book kept in the State Department, subject to future inspection and exposure, if there was anything corruptly or improperly done in relation to the fund; but it is a fund in the Treasury, and differs not at all from other money in the Treasury, except in the form of drawing it; for the President, having the power to control his executive officers, can reach the control of the Treasury indirectly in other cases.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. I do not know the formalities of this thing. I do not know whether the President must draw a warrant. I suppose he might go with the law in his hand, and say, give me the money; but the President has it in his pleasure to draw it. When I say this is putting money in the President's pocket, I mean it is giving it to him at any time he pleases to take it, before any public use can be made of it; to keep it in his pocket indefinitely until it chooses to please him, by his ministers, to make provision for its payment to Spain. It puts all at his will and pleasure.

Mr. SEWARD. Will the honorable Senator from Kentucky allow me to interrupt him for a moment?

Mr. CRITTENDEN. Certainly.

Mr. SEWARD. A matter occurred in this debate just now which I wish may be set right. I understood the honorable Senator from Louisiana to offer to the honorable Senator from Kentucky, that, if he would propose any amendment that would keep this money from the President's hands and in the Treasury, until after the treaty should be ratified by the Senate of the United States——

Mr. SLIDELL. I said no such thing. I said, in the terms of the message itself, until the treaty should have been ratified in compliance with the recommendation of the message, which, of course, meant ratification by Spain, and signature by our agent.

Mr. SEWARD. I beg pardon of the honorable Senator from Kentucky, for my interruption. I misunderstood the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. CRITTENDEN. I should be very glad in any way I could do it, consistently with my own sense of propriety, to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba; not through any avidity for more territory, but because of the peculiar fitness of the Island of Cuba to our great interests, because of the insecurity it may create under foreign control, because of the peculiar advantages it would give to us. It belongs to us geographically; it must come to us; it must become ours before very long. We need not, I think, be very impatient about it. We are getting along very well without it. Every day and every hour of the day, we are getting more and more able to do for ourselves and by ourselves, without the Island of Cuba or any other island, or all the other islands in the ocean. Tell me that Cuba is necessary, absolutely necessary to the preservation of this Government? Why, sir, my national pride as an American revolts at the idea. Tell me that the want of that island will destroy and dismember this Union? No such thing. I allow no such ideas to enter or possess my mind.

Sir, let us cultivate the internal resources of our prosperity; let us grow, as we are destined to grow, and, in the natural course of things, Cuba will fall, like the ripe fruit, into our lap. We had better hasten slowly in this matter.

We do not want the trouble and expense of governing other people; much

less do we want to bring into the bosom of our Republic an unprepared and alien people. When we have had possession of Chihuahua for a good long while under a protectorate, to guard the borders of Arizona, it may grow into an American province, for all you and I know; and I may have the honor of addressing the gentleman from Chihuahua as one of my brother Senators; but I hope I shall never see that time. I do not want to see our American race mingled up with that sort of evil communication. I mean evil in a political sense. They do not understand our rights; they do not think as we think; they do not speak as we do.

I am not for universal expansion. Some little concentration, some little condensation, seems to me to be the mode of gathering together the greatest amount of human or of intellectual power. Of late, it has been said that expansion is the true policy of the country, and that none but cowards and fools oppose it. Such is the declaration which the newspapers ascribe to the President of the United States; I will not believe it to be authentic, though I have seen it in the Union newspaper, and I am told the Intelligencer reports the same thing. I say I will not consider this as authentic, and I will not act upon it as such. If a President should ever be found to say that in the ears of the Congress of the United States, to say in a message to Congress such words, then we should know how to repel such false policy and false aspersion. If that be the policy of the President, why has he not told us so? The Constitution makes it his duty to recommend to Congress the policy which he thinks necessary and proper for the country. If he had said such a thing to a petty crowd at midnight, why could he not have said it to us here? It cannot be.

Sir, I want my country to go on growing greater and greater every day. I do not know that that greatness is to be achieved simply by adding more and more acres to our territory. There is a great deal to be done in the interior of our country—a great deal of moral and of intellectual culture and of material improvement. I want to see that glorious country cultivated, improved, and adorned by the hand of industry and of art; its people educated and enlightened; and union and liberty and public virtue engraved everywhere upon its bosom.